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Abstract 
In this paper I am considering the numerous effects that hosting refugees can have on a host 
country. These effects can be seen when examining a host country’s health, economic, 
educational, and security sectors. In addition, many cases of refugee flows are associated with 
conflict contagion, which may cause a refugee population to become militarized. After reviewing 
the relevant literature on these topics, I study how these possible effects unfold in the context of 
the Syrian refugees currently escaping to Jordan from their civil war. The Kingdom of Jordan 
and its people are significantly affected by the increased stresses that have been seen in all 
services as a result of more than 500,000 Syrian refugees. Additionally, the transnational threats 
of Syrian opposition fighters operating from within Jordan and the potential of Syrian 
government reprisals against Jordan are significant and growing threats that must be considered. 
Through a qualitative analysis of secondary sources, I examine these threats and make 
conclusions as to how Jordan’s current course of action may affect the country and its population 
in the long term. 
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Introduction 
There is a robust literature on the transnational effects of conflict in neighboring 
countries and the consequences of hosting refugees. The Middle East is largely overlooked in 
this literature, and Jordan in particular presents an outstanding but difficult case to study due to 
its historic and constant supply of refugees, as well as its unstable geographical neighbors. 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a small, middle-income country in the Middle East, 
with an official population of nearly seven million people. The country has been ruled by a 
hereditary monarchy, since the 1921, when the British authorities carved out Transjordan from 
historical Palestine and installed Hashemite rule under their own mandate. To the surprise of 
many observers, Jordan has maintained regime stability despite being surrounded on virtually all 
sides by conflict. Today, Jordan is neighbored by Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
to the West, Syria to the North, Iraq to the East, and Saudi Arabia to the South. Very shortly after 
achieving independence from British Mandate rule in 1946, Jordan was involved in the 1948 
Arab-Israeli War, which resulted in Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank area of Palestine as 
well as East Jerusalem, territories originally designated by the UN Partition Plan to become part 
of a proposed Palestinian state.  
Some scholars believe that because Palestinians held Jordan’s King Abdullah I 
responsible for their loss of Palestine to the new state of Israel, he was assassinated shortly 
thereafter. Along with this annexation came hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who either 
fled their homes and towns or were forcibly expelled by Jewish militias. Jordan was the only 
Arab country to grant immediate citizenship to most of the Palestinians it received. Those 
eligible for citizenship were those who claimed Palestinian residency before May 15, 1948 and 
were residing in Jordan between December 20
th
, 1949 and February 16, 1954. Today, those 
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Palestinians and their descendents have become a sizeable portion of Jordan’s population, with 
estimates placing their numbers between a third and more than half of Jordan’s population. 
Another influx of Palestinian refugees occurred after Jordan’s crushing defeat in the 1967 
Six-Day War, which resulted in the loss of the West Bank and East Jerusalem to Israel. In its 
weakened military state after the Six-Day War, Jordan’s state institutions and basic control over 
the country fell into jeopardy when radical Palestinian militias destabilized the Jordanian 
monarchy. With Jordan’s tacit approval, these groups had been orchestrating attacks against 
Israel from within Jordan. However, Jordan’s reluctance to further aid their fight against Israel’s 
occupation of Palestine led to their frustration and eventual attempt at taking power. This conflict 
culminated in the 1970 event known as Black September, a relatively short civil war in Jordan 
that claimed more than 3,000 lives and resulted in the complete and forcible expulsion of all 
militant organizations from Jordanian territory. Then-Prime Minister of Jordan, Wasfi al-Tal, 
was essential to Jordan’s internal response to ensuring that the remaining Palestinian population 
was pacified within Jordan. Presumably as a result of his actions, he was assassinated the next 
year in Egypt while attending a conference. The numbers of Palestinians taking refuge in Jordan 
has increased incrementally as a result of other events such as the 1987 Palestinian “Intifada” 
and Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 drove 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to seek safety in Jordan, many of whom are still in Jordan. To 
date, Jordan has received more than 500,000 Syrian refugees since the start of the Syrian civil 
war in 2011. Estimates by the UN and other agencies predict that the number of Syrian refugees 
in Jordan will exceed one million before the end of 2013. 
As this brief historical survey reveals, the conflicts that have continuously surrounded 
Jordan throughout the last six decades have forced Jordan’s involvement in regional conflicts in 
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numerous different ways. Hosting the multitudes seeking refuge from these dangers has been an 
ongoing struggle for this small, dynamic constitutional monarchy, and has also been a source of 
domestic conflicts and external threats for nearly the entirety of the country’s existence.  
Judging by the events surrounding this regional haven, the pattern shows no sign of 
cessation or change in the future. I will attempt to determine, using qualitative analysis of 
secondary sources, if the multifaceted ways that Jordan has become involved in the current 
Syrian civil war will once again breed domestic conflict within the kingdom. The first section of 
the paper presents a comprehensive literature review on hosting refugees and transnational 
conflict. The second section includes the qualitative analysis of secondary sources and applies 
the insights of the existing debates found in the literature to the case of Jordan and its current 
population of Syrian refugees. The third section summarizes the findings and proposes 
recommendations for scholars and policy makers. 
 
Section I: Literature Review 
Early studies on interstate conflicts, civil wars and refugees have primarily focused on 
them as separate issues, under the assumption that they each occur separately from one another 
in a vacuum. More recently, researchers have begun to examine them as connected, intertwined 
social problems. This section will provide a review of relevant literature, starting with the effects 
of hosting refugees, and continuing to the effects of transnational conflict. 
General Effects 
There is a significant collection of literature that has expanded in recent years discussing 
the benefits of hosting refugees. In her study of the effects of hosting refugees on western 
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Tanzania, Karen Jacobsen concedes that refugees impose many burdens on their host countries, 
ranging from security and the economy to the environment, but she counters that refugees can 
also represent a significant source of resources. The presence of refugees can bring international 
humanitarian assistance, economic assets, and human capital with them to the host country. 
Jacobsen refers to these material, social, and political resources as “refugee resources,” which 
“potentially represent an important state building contribution to the host state” (Jacobsen 2002a, 
578). The difficulty, Jacobsen discovers, in the state actually taking advantage of these refugee 
resources, lies in overcoming hindrances of distance and extending the state’s bureaucratic reach 
to outlying areas. Jacobsen argues that overcoming these hindrances can create an opportunity to 
“boost the state’s capacity in those areas and strengthen its presence at the periphery of its 
territory,” because “refugee resources and security threats push the state towards a level of 
activity in border areas that did not previously exist” (Jacobsen 2002a, 578). Jacobsen concludes 
that the presence of refugees can increase the overall welfare of the host community, both 
through “international assistance ‘trickling out’ into the host community and through the 
economic activities of refugees contributing to the host community’s standard of living” 
(Jacobsen 2002a, 580). 
In the first substantial effort at quantifying the effects of a refugee population on their 
host country, Beth Elise Whitaker (2002) studies the realities of western Tanzania hosting nearly 
1.3 million refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
between 1993 and 1998. The sudden increase of population – by more than 50% in the regions 
that hosted the majority of the refugees – presented researchers at the time with an opportunity to 
observe these effects in real time. Whitaker makes the determination to focus not just on whether 
the host community itself would benefit, but to “disaggregate the question: who benefits and who 
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loses from refugee influxes and why?” (Whitaker 2002, 340). Through the study of a variety of 
factors, ranging from food prices to labor, the environment, trade prices, infrastructure, crime, 
education, health, and social aspects, Whitaker finds that “the distribution of burdens and 
benefits was not uniform throughout western Tanzania” (Whitaker 2002, 344).  
She argues that socio-economic class, as characterized by education, health, wealth, and 
other factors, was one of the biggest causes of disproportionate advantage/disadvantage. 
“Wealthy hosts especially were able to take advantage of economic opportunities and expand 
upon their wealth during that period.” Because of their pre-existing wealth, they were in a good 
position to use existing funds and capital to establish or expand businesses catering to the newly 
expanded population. Whitaker observes that “poor Tanzanians, on the other hand, were not able 
to benefit in the same ways and became worse off during the refugee presence” (Whitaker 2002, 
347). In order to enhance the positive effects of hosting a refugee camp, Whitaker makes several 
recommendations that will help to minimize the negative effects while still helping the local 
population. According to Whitaker, establishing smaller camps, approximately 20,000 refugees, 
near local villages is essential. She posits that allowing refugees to farm small plots of land, 
enjoy shared markets, and freedom of movement, could enable refugees to contribute to the local 
economy in more significant ways than simply buying aid supplies in bulk (Whitaker 2002, 355). 
Encouraging these types of policies could have a multiplying effect for the economy, as observed 
by Jacobsen (2002a). 
Livelihoods 
Whitaker refers to the presence of refugees in a community impacting the livelihoods of 
members of the host community. Livelihoods, as Jacobsen discusses in another of her works, are 
defined as “the means used to maintain and sustain life” (Jacobsen 2002b, 98). Jacobsen here 
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goes beyond “refugee resources” to include household assets, capital, social institutions, 
networks, and strategies. Attempting to study “livelihoods in conflict,” she emphasizes “the need 
to reduce vulnerability and risks that are a result of conflict,” and measures how these livelihood 
methods and strategies also impact the host community (Jacobsen, 98). Jacobsen’s express goal 
in this effort is to determine how to maintain and support “human security” in these difficult 
types of situations. She defines human security as “economic, civil, and political security – a 
situation in which people can pursue livelihoods without violent conflict” (Jacobsen 2002b, 96). 
She refers to pursuing a livelihood in conflict as “the availability, extent and mix of resources, 
the strategies used to access and mobilize these resources, and the goals and changing priorities 
of refugees” (Jacobsen 2002b, 99, author’s emphasis).  
Although Jacobsen differentiates refugee livelihoods because they are a vulnerable 
population and therefore more susceptible to challenges and changes, she insists that both the 
refugee and host livelihoods will have mutual benefits if they are permitted to intermix in the 
economy. Jacobsen determines that the refugee policies of the host government and that 
government’s willingness to cooperate with international organizations such as the United 
Nations High Council on Refugees will significantly affect the livelihoods of both the host 
community and the refugees themselves. The choices made by policy-makers will have a direct 
impact on whether refugees will be allowed to pursue livelihood strategies at all, or if they can 
even leave the refugee camp to begin with. Jacobsen finds that Income Generating Programs 
(IGPs) for refugee populations, access to farming, and freedom of movement in the local 
economy are important in supporting the human security of the refugees in these situations. 
Jacobsen also discusses how the implementation of IGPs affects the host community and 
the refugee populations themselves. IGPs “are intended to enable refugees to attain ‘self 
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sufficiency’ by providing economic inputs and training for livelihood activities like agriculture, 
service provision, or trade” (Jacobsen 2002b, 110). Jacobsen notes that some host governments 
do allow refugees to farm or participate in income-generating activities, but because IGPs are 
sometimes associated with integration, a weary population may not wish to allow them to be 
promoted for the refugees. Host countries generally prefer refugee stays to be short, and host 
governments tend to resist programs that promote integration. This preference is enacted through 
policy regarding refugees, and represents one of the biggest factors preventing refugees’ pursuit 
of livelihoods. Because of host government policies, refugees often have limited standards of 
protection and physical security; their freedom of movement and settlement can be restricted; 
and they can be restricted from property rights and employment opportunities. 
Health 
Jacobsen notes that health concerns are one of the main reasons commonly cited by 
governments as a reason to not keep their borders open constantly to refugees (Jacobsen 2002a, 
579). Javier E Baez (2008) sees the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and resulting refugee 
flow into Kagera, Tanzania as an opportunity to study the health consequences of hosting 
refugees. Specifically, Baez focuses on short and long term causal effects of hosting refugees on 
the health outcomes of local children. According to Baez, the risks to the host population during 
times of regional strife could include “disease outbreaks, food and land scarcity, unsafe drinking 
water, overburdened school and health care facilities, environmental degradation, crime, and 
other concerns” (Baez 2008, 2). Baez notes that these conditions are particularly dangerous for 
young children, and that these combined problems could affect early childhood development.  
To conduct his study, Baez uses data from household surveys conducted yearly in 
Kagera, Tanzania between 1991 and 1994, and again in 2004. The Kagera Health and 
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Development Survey (KHDS) contains information on “household demographics, education, 
health, anthropometrics, household activities, household and individual expenditures, local 
markets, among others, as well as questionnaires at the community, school, and health facility 
level” (Baez 2008, 11). Through his analysis, Baez finds a worsening of children’s 
anthropometrics, 15-20% higher rates of infectious diseases, and an increase of about seven 
percent in child mortality under the age of five, among other concerning factors. Baez notes that 
this burden of hosting refugees decreased average height in early adulthood by nearly two 
centimeters and lowered literacy rates by more than eight percent. He concludes that “despite 
any potential benefits this enormous population movement may have brought to these regions, 
…in the case of young children, they were largely outweighed by its negative impacts” (Baez 
2008, 25).  
Baez notes the dangers that can potentially affect refugee camps and their surrounding 
host areas, and cites the Benaco refugee camp in Kagera, Tanzania. At one point in the 1990’s, 
the camp hosted more than 400,000 refugees, and suffered from many problems, including 
“water and food scarcity, lack of waste collection, epidemics (bloody dysentery, malaria, 
pneumonia, meningitis, and measles), malnutrition and an increase in criminal activities” (Baez 
2008, 9). Whitaker notes that when refugees entered Tanzania, “local health facilities quickly 
became over-stretched,” and that “after the establishment of hospitals in the camps, refugees 
continued to use district and regional facilities as referral hospitals” (Whitaker 2002, 343). The 
refugee presence was also correlated with an influx of diseases such as high-fever malaria, 
intense dysentery, skin diseases in children, and sexually transmitted diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS. 
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 Despite implementing numerous regulations to curb harmful or disruptive behavior from 
refugees, many of the families displaced into Tanzania settled outside of camps and utilized 
resources and areas usually used by locals. According to Baez’s historical account, the “villages 
close to refugee camps were not isolated from the massive arrival of migrants and host 
communities were frequently exposed to the increased presence of refugee settlements” (Baez 
2008, 10). This exposure to the problems of the refugee population posed serious risks to the 
health and well-being of the host population. Baez notes that it could create an “unfavorable 
health environment” that would “adversely affect the health status of parents as well as the 
amount and quality of other forms of investment in children such as health care, calorie 
consumption and parents’ time spent with children” (Baez 2008, 25). 
Environment 
Studies examining the impact of hosting refugees on the host country’s environment are 
especially important when considering how Jordan is being affected. Adrian Martin’s 2005 study 
on environmental conflict and refugee host communities examines how “issues of resource 
scarcity interplay with social processes, stimulating well-known triggers of violence.” He notes 
that “environmental scarcity acts as an indirect cause of conflict by amplifying/triggering 
traditional causes of conflict such as ethnic difference” (Martin 2005, 330). Martin states that the 
resource demand associated with an influx of refugees concentrated in one location can 
dramatically increase after settlements are created, “leading to accelerated conversion of forest to 
agricultural land, collection of firewood, extraction of surface and ground waters, fishing and 
hunting (Martin 2005, 332). Concurrently, “the assimilative capacity of environments can be 
stretched by the additional wastes produced, and this can exacerbate threats to human health.” 
Martin cites UNHCR’s 1996 Environmental Guidelines, which identify six categories of 
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environmental impact as a result of hosting refugees. Those categories include: “natural resource 
degradation; irreversible impacts on natural resources; impacts on health; impacts on social 
conditions; impacts on local populations; and economic impacts” (Martin 2005, 332). Martin 
emphasizes that environmental changes due to hosting refugees seems guaranteed to evoke a 
social response from the hosting population. In discussing why refugees cause environmental 
problems, he asserts that the chief cause is sheer numbers. “Population increase, especially when 
it occurs so rapidly, places additional stresses on local resources” (Martin 2005, 332). The 
utilization of scarce resources and the creation of waste, multiplied by the number of refugees, 
can create a huge strain on the host society. 
Martin notes in his evaluation of Environment-Conflict Relations that “where 
unproductive intergroup conflicts occur [regarding resources], they tend to manifest themselves 
as conflicts over ethnicity, class and other existing social fault-lines” (Martin 2005, 333). He 
cites the social psychology of intergroup conflicts, suggesting “that social identity groups 
become less permeable… under conditions that foster perceptions of relative deprivation and 
threats to self-esteem” (Martin 2005, 334). Martin’s paper utilizes a theoretical approach to study 
a resource management regime in a case study that takes place in an Ethiopian refugee camp. 
Upon studying these “participatory environmental management programs” through the case 
study, Martin finds that management regimes that strive to be participatory and inclusive for both 
the refugee and host communities could help them to avoid unproductive resource conflicts. 
Whitaker notes that the presence of refugees in Tanzania “negatively affected local 
access to environmental resources” (Whitaker 2002, 342). Existing environmental problems such 
as deforestation, water shortages, and environmental degradation were compounded by the influx 
of refugees. “Refugees used 65 percent more wood on average than local Tanzanians. …Water 
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resources were also depleted during the refugee presence, and several rivers were diverted from 
host villages to refugee camps” (Whitaker 2002, 342). She also notes that while villages that 
were closer to refugee camps could take better advantage of refugee labor and trade 
opportunities, “hosts were also more affected by the negative consequences… including 
environmental degradation…” (Whitaker 2002, 349).  
In her 2008 research for UNHCR on the environmental impact of hosting refugees, Leah 
Berry highlights the importance of fostering a good relationship between the host and refugee 
communities.
 She notes a “growing acceptance” by UNHCR and organizations that work with 
refugees “that the presence of refugees often leads to environmental degradation and natural 
resource depletion both within and around the settlements” (Berry 2008, 1).  Acknowledging this 
reality is a recent addition to UNHCR protocols. Her case study of Tanzania’s refugee flows 
from the 1990’s shows that “without doubt, the environmental degradation…has created 
problems between the refugees and the local communities” (Berry 2008, 17). In examining the 
lives of the host community around the refugee population, she finds that they noticed changes 
such as “deforestation, soil erosion and depletion of water resources,” in addition to brush fires 
and illegal poaching” (Berry 2008, 14). She concludes by suggesting to the managers of future 
refugee situations that they work hard to prevent environmental degradation, investigate the 
causes of degradation when it happens, and implement more projects to assist refugee hosting 
areas. Berry also finds that the conflict resolution meetings held in Tanzania between members 
of the refugee and host populations were effective and recommended that they be used regularly 
in all refugee situations (Berry 2008, 18). 
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Education 
The host country’s education system is frequently cited as one of the resources strained 
by the refugee population’s presence. Whitaker notes that “during the influx, border area schools 
were damaged when refugees slept in classrooms, burned desks as firewood, and filled latrines” 
(Whitaker 2002, 343). In discussing the different livelihood strategies of host communities, 
Jacobsen highlights that “different communities had different levels of education… before the 
refugees arrived. The communities that were already better educated and had surpluses of food 
and cash crops grown locally were in a good position to benefit from the newly increased local 
market” (Jacobsen 2002b, 354). In contrast, communities with lower levels of education 
struggled to reap the benefits of the refugee presence. In regards to the refugees themselves, 
Jacobsen notes that education or professional skills are often some of the inherent human capital 
resources that they bring with them into their new environment (Jacobsen 2002b, 100). Utilizing 
these skills in the host environment and economy could aid the host country’s overall 
development.  
Jacobsen recommends including programs for refugees such as vocational training and 
access to educational institutions in order to support their livelihoods in their new community. 
This kind of training and capacity building could make them less dependent on aid. She further 
states that in many countries, access to school education is one of many civil and social rights 
denied to refugees, sometimes as a means to discourage the refugees from attempting to settle 
permanently in the host country (Jacobsen 2002b, 101). Although their study mainly focuses on 
the security implications of refugee-host conflict, it is important to discuss a work by Peter Kirui 
and John Mwaruvie (2012), who note that in Kenya, local Somalis who immigrated to Kenya 
before the refugees feel that refugees are treated better than them because they get humanitarian 
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assistance from organizations like UNHCR. “Refugees are given food, medical attention, and 
education among other social services. The majority of Kenyan Somalis cannot afford this and 
therefore view the refugees (who are also Somalis) as enemies who are taking ‘Milk and Honey’ 
while they starve” (Kirui and Mwaruvie 2012, 165).  
Food 
Following a similar trend, David Saah and Jennifer Alix-Garcia also study the effects of 
refugee inflows in Tanzania, with their work focusing primarily on the effect of refugee camps 
on nearby markets. Saah and Alix-Garcia see inconclusive results from other researchers looking 
at the same subject, and proceed to use “variations in refugee policy and food over time to 
examine the impact of proximity to refugee camps and aid on prices of Tanzanian agricultural 
goods” (Saah and Alix-Garcia 2009, 150). Their effort shows an increase in price for goods in 
markets that were closer to refugee camps, and they observe that the effect was larger for areas 
around Rwandan refugees than it was for those around Burundian refugees. Saah and Alix-
Garcia suspect that this phenomenon could have been the result of the differences in diet 
between these groups, or perhaps “because of the relatively smaller and slower nature” of 
Burundi refugee influx (Saah and Alix-Garcia 2009, 168). They use a statistical model to study 
the effects of food aid and refugees on local market prices, and find that “in the context of the 
model, these price increases are explained by the increase in demand for these products by the 
incoming refugees. The effect of food aid is limited to aid-related goods” (Saah and Alix-Garcia 
2009, 160).  
Whitaker notes that agriculture was “the primary occupation of more than 90 percent of 
the residents of western Tanzania and the large majority of refugees,” and that sudden population 
increases was shown to affect food security as a result of the influx (Whitaker 2002, 341). 
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Refugees in Tanzania also “used a variety of strategy to gain access to [crops], including trading, 
purchasing, and stealing.” Whitaker reports that prices “skyrocketed” for locally grown staples as 
a result of the refugee influx, especially for local staples such as cooking bananas. Returning to 
class differences, Whitaker observes that poor Tanzanians “were not able to benefit in the same 
ways [as wealthy Tanzanians] and became worse off during the refugee presence” (Whitaker 
2002, 348). Tanzania experienced high inflation rates at that time, which increased prices of 
basic supplies. If farmers were growing surplus supplies, they benefitted from the increased 
demand. On the other hand, subsistence farmers had to rely on food purchases to meet basic 
needs.  
Trade and Labor 
Whitaker also notes that local subsistence farmers in Tanzania were unable to hire 
refugee laborers “because they did not have sufficient disposable funds or crops to pay the 
refugees” (Whitaker 2002, 347). In addition, sub-subsistence farmers were unable to sell their 
excess labor during the refugee influx. The refugees were willing to work for far less than local 
Tanzanians would, and as a result, “the wage paid to a casual laborer dropped by 50 percent in 
many areas” (Whitaker 2002, 348). For those that could afford to pay refugees for their labor, 
those living in “villages closer to camps were better able to take advantage of [cheap] refugee 
labor” (Whitaker 2002, 349). Interactions such as trade and employment were also greatly 
affected by government policy. According to Whitaker, “during the height of the refugee 
presence in Ngara and Karagwe districts in 1994 and 1995, there were few restrictions on the 
mobility of refugees and hosts. Tanzanian – and refugee-owned businesses – thrived.” After that 
point, the Tanzanian government carefully controlled the movement of refugees within the 
country, severely limiting employment and trade between refugees and hosts. 
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Crime and Violence 
Much of the literature on the effects of hosting refugees focuses on the direct and indirect 
dangers of hosting refugees that can or could result in violence and insecurity for the country and 
the community or region hosting them. Jacobsen suggests that refugee resources may, in some 
cases, be unable to help the development of the host country due to the insecurity of the refugee 
hosting area (Jacobsen 2002a, 578). She describes refugee flows as a “challenge to one of the 
key principles of state sovereignty: the control of borders and of non-citizens in the country,” and 
identifies issues such as “cross-border raids and the import of conflict from the sending country” 
as some of the most serious problems (Jacobsen 2002a, 586). Undefended and/or lawless refugee 
camps are also associated with security problems. Jacobsen notes that petty and organized crime, 
theft of resources intended for refugee consumption, recruitment of young men into militias or 
crime syndicates, political radicalism and militancy are listed as chronic problems for many host 
countries (Jacobsen 2002a, 586). 
Some of the problems facing host communities, governments, and staff of refugee camps 
include ascertaining the identities of refugees, crime, military recruitment, and political control 
of the camp. Jacobsen observes that “host states have difficulty keeping refugees inside camps or 
designated areas, and most countries have large numbers of refugees living outside camps in 
both rural and urban areas” (Jacobsen 2002a, 587). She reports that some camp authorities 
attempt to separate combatants and criminals from refugees, but she warns that in some cases, 
this could increase the public perception that all refugees are potentially problematic. 
Jacobsen identifies three sets of challenges that result from what she calls “the double 
impact of resource and security threats”:  
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 Increased demand on the state bureaucracy to manage the denser population and 
aid agencies in regions where the state is absent or weakly represented 
 Increased demand on the state apparatus to control and manage contested refugee 
resources, either for its own state-building purposes or to ensure that its citizens 
benefit from these resources 
 Increased demand on the state’s security apparatus to control its border and 
address security threats posed by the spillover of conflict and troublemakers 
entering with refugees 
In order to counter these challenges, Jacobsen concludes that the state has to make sure that the 
international community sees the refugees as its responsibility in order to maintain assistance 
levels, ensure that refugee assistance benefits its citizens and the state itself, ensure that the state 
is not sidelined by relief agencies or risks losing legitimacy, and be seen by its citizens to be 
actively involved in bringing benefits and addressing security problems (Jacobsen 2002a, 588). 
Despite these challenges, Jacobsen maintains that in host countries undergoing state-building 
activities, refugee resources represent significant potential to enhance those activities. 
In many cases of protracted refugee situations, the host country sees an increase in crime. 
In her study of the effect of the refugee influxes on Tanzania, Whitaker notes that Tanzania’s 
“criminal justice system was also overburdened; according to government records, refugees at 
times represented as many as 75 percent of jail inmates” (Whitaker 2002, 343). She also suggests 
that in cases where local residents have access to enter the refugee camp freely, the camps tend 
to become “associated with problems such as drunkenness, prostitution, and sexual promiscuity,” 
and that “crime rates rose sharply, especially for murder, armed robbery, and illegal possession 
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of firearms” (Whitaker 2002, 345). These problems can significantly contribute to local crime 
and can create a negative impression of the refugee population on the host community. 
In studying the effectiveness of policies designed to limit violence in and around refugee 
camps in Kenya, Jeff Crisp (2000) examines two refugee-populated areas of Kenya. Crisp notes 
that while it is “impossible to quantify the amount of violence that takes place in and around 
Kenya’s refugee camps,” one can determine that the level appeared at that time to be rising. 
Reports from that time indicated that “frequent outbreaks of violence and unrest occur without 
warning,” and that the security situation was deteriorating (Crisp 2000, 601). Crisp refers to the 
responses of refugees in these areas discussing the issues confronting them while living in the 
camp. Rather than demanding to return home or to receive education for their children, they 
relented that “their safety is under constant and serious threat;” one individual remarked that “it 
is of no advantage for us to get a full ration from UNHCR if our lives are always at risk from 
insecurity” (Crisp 2000, 602). Some of the specific sources of insecurity that refugees faced in 
that situation included domestic and community violence, conscription into rebel groups and 
militias, abuse from camp-based justice systems, sexual abuse and violence, theft and armed 
robbery, clan-based violence, and violence between refugees and the local population (Crisp 
2000, 602-610). Crisp cites an internal 1998 UNHCR report which notes “a persistent climate of 
suspicion” between refugees and local populations.  
Kirui and Mwaruvie return to the issue of hosting refugees in Kenya, twelve years after 
Crisp’s earlier work, and determine that many of the same issues remain prevalent. They begin 
their study looking at the general security problem of hosting refugees, noting that “the presence 
of refugees in many third world host states is further compounded by armed groups of exiles 
actively engaged in warfare with political objectives” (Kirui and Mwaruvie 2012, 162). This 
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participation can invite military retaliation and complicate the host state’s relations with its 
neighbors. These poisoned relations could advance to aggression if not handled carefully. 
Further, Kirui and Mwaruvie warn that proximity to a failed state such as Somalia invites other 
serious problems such as arms proliferation. They find that “lethal modern weapons smuggled 
into Kenya from Somalia have placed firepower into the hands of Kenyan and Somali bandit 
gangs” (Kirui and Mwaruvie 2012, 166). They also cite Gil Loescher’s 1992 paper for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Refugee Movements and International Security. 
Loescher highlights that in many cases refugees are seen only as a humanitarian problem for the 
international community to deal with, which can neglect their potential as a political problem. 
Loescher notes “the presence of refugees accelerates existing internal conflicts in the host 
countries. During the 1980’s for example, the proliferation of arms following the influx of three 
million Afghans contributed to a resurgence of Pathan conquest in Pakistan” (Loescher 1992, 6).  
Transnational Effects 
Militarization of Refugees. One of the biggest externalities of civil wars, and one that 
contributes to the creation of rebel sanctuaries, is the threat of the militarization of a refugee 
population that fled from a civil war in a neighboring country. In her working paper for the 
Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series, Sarah Kenyon Lischer describes some of the 
conditions that can lead to the militarization of a refugee population. She notes that militarization 
can occur “due to the presence of soldiers or militant exiles (including war criminals) who live 
near the refugee populated area and interact with the refugees” (Lischer 1999, 3). In conditions 
where refugees or exiles are permitted to store arms and train outside the camp but still interact 
with the people and services of the camp, the population of the camp can become militarized. 
Rebels might hide among the refugees, and could bring arms or cause militarization of the 
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refugee flow. Citing the example of a mass exodus of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in 1999, 
Lischer recalls a UNHCR official expressing concern “that the Serbs would target the refugee 
camps because ‘the refugee population and the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] are closely 
linked,’” and additional reports that the KLA forcibly conscripted refugee men into the rebel 
army (Lischer 1999, 3).  
Depending on the circumstances, militarized refugees may be a threat to their home state, 
but she also cites examples where they pose a threat to the host country, such as Liberia, Sudan, 
and Rwanda. Although scholars discussing the militarization of refugees acknowledge that not 
all refugees become hostile or violent, they all stress that some refugee populations do develop 
violent or militarized tendencies under certain conditions. Stedman and Tanner’s 2003 book, 
Refugee Manipulation is cited as claiming that militarized refugees are present in about 15% of 
refugee crises. In another Lischer paper from 2003, she notes that “refugee relief can feed 
militants; sustain and protect the militants’ supporters; contribute to the war economy; and 
provide legitimacy to combatants” (Lischer 2003, 82). A militant or rebel groups’ choice to 
intentionally use refugees can help with recruitment or conscription, as well as accessing aid and 
benefits from international donors and groups. Lischer has grouped refugee-related political 
violence into several different categories, including violence between refugees and the receiving 
state and between refugees and the sending state.  
Transnational Conflict. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch were the first scholars to 
“systematically examine the effects of refugees on the likelihood of conflict in refugee-recipient 
states” (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 338). They argue that international refugee migration can 
often link conflict in one country to conflict in neighbors. Through the migration of refugees, 
social networks can expand to other states, potentially “physically extending rebel networks 
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across space through their geographical mobility” (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 341). These 
networks could be operating explicitly against their home country or could be importing 
“conflicts, arms, and ideologies from neighboring states that facilitate the spread of conflict” 
(Salehyan and Gledtisch 2006, 342). Refugee flows can also change the ethnic balance in a 
country, which can cause local discontent toward both the refugees themselves and the 
government that allowed them in. They find that countries that experience an influx of refugees 
from neighboring states are significantly more likely to experience civil wars themselves” 
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 338). 
In his 2011 book, Rebels Without Borders, Idean Salehyan discusses rebel sanctuaries in 
neighboring states, and the conditions in which these situations occur. The usual advantage of 
force held by the contested regime is very constrained by the state’s internationally recognized 
borders, and when rebel groups choose to operate outside of those borders, they are able to more 
easily evade repression and reprisal. Safely outside of the state’s reach, these apparently weak 
actors “have a significant advantage against geographically constrained states, whose power and 
authority are defined by a particular sovereign space” (Salehyan 2009, Rebels Without Borders). 
Using the data in the Armed Conflict Database, Salehyan finds that 55 percent of rebel groups 
since 1945 have utilized territory outside of their target state’s borders, either for mobilizing and 
organizing or to sustain their activities and recruit. He notes that “a large share of research on 
civil conflict treats nation-states as hermetically sealed, independent units,” but that transnational 
rebels (TNRs) “complicate this neat picture by bridging the internal/external divide.”  Salehyan 
specifies that TNRs are more likely to gain access to external territory if that neighboring state is 
too weak to prevent access. He concurs with previous researchers that TNRs often use refugee 
camps for supplies and recruits.  
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Salehyan continues that international rivalries can be fueled by support of rebel 
organizations, and weak states may be dragged unwillingly into international disputes. 
Accusations of harboring militants may lead to cross-border attacks or other types of retaliation 
from that neighbor. He elaborates that support of TNRs can take many forms, including 
deliberately hosting rebel bases, financial support, or other in-kind sources of support. Salehyan 
notes that “hosting rebel organizations is indicative of preexisting conflict between states, 
although support for insurgency will exacerbate international tensions.” He goes on to clarify 
that “all forms of support… are likely to provoke international tension, but providing sanctuary 
to TNRs is particularly likely to spark a military confrontation between states.” Through his 
quantitative study of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and rebel external bases, he finds that 
in 83 percent of cases with external bases and MIDs coinciding, “the presence of rebels was cited 
as a major factor” (Salehyan 2011, Rebels). 
Conflict Contagion. In her study on the spread of refugees and the contagion of civil 
wars, Forsberg (2009) hypothesizes that “a state receiving refugees from a state with internal 
armed conflict is more likely to experience onset of armed conflict” (Forsberg 2009, 11). She 
notes that previous studies that found migration to cause conflict may have conflated conflict in 
general with the internal competition over scarce resources in the host country, and not 
necessarily because of factors related to conflicts in the refugees’ home country. Forsberg 
compares her research to Salehyan and Gleditsch’s 2006 paper but notes that they only “sum up 
the total number of refugees hosted from all neighboring states. Then it is not possible to 
determine from which neighboring state the source of conflict spread emanated, if such a process 
indeed transpired” (Forsberg 2009, 17). Forsberg evaluates the impact of hosting refugees over 
time. She suggests that “the effect of refugee flows appears to be conditioned upon the level of 
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repression in the host state” and that “refugee flows are associated with the contagion of civil 
conflict, only when the host state is characterized by low levels of state repression” (Forsberg 
2009, 28). Conversely, she asserts that countries with high levels of state repression may be able 
to prevent or minimize conflict contagion through the use of force, despite receiving refugees 
from a neighbor in conflict. 
Alex Braithwaite (2010) examines how states are able to resist the “infection” of conflict 
contagion because of state capacity and stability. Braithwaite argues that the risk of conflict 
contagion diminishes when the state has higher capacity to exert control over its territory and 
people (Braithwaite 2010, 311). Braithwaite describes this kind of state capacity in reference to 
conflict contagion as the state’s “ability to block and/or peacefully absorb the artifacts of civil 
conflict… these include flows of refugees of war, weapons and illicit materials” (Braithwaite 
2010, 313). Conversely, he states that a state with a low level of capacity would have difficulty 
generating effective countermeasures to such threats. He notes that “interstate contiguity, long 
shared boundaries, and proximate conflict arenas in neighboring countries” are factors that could 
help prove the spillover effects of international conflicts (Braithwaite 2010, 312). He also finds 
that the flow of refugees between states could act as a precursor to spreading conflict across that 
boundary (Braithwaite 2010, 313).  
In a forthcoming article in the Journal of Politics, Braithwaite and Jessica Maves discuss 
how autocratic institutions fare when exposed to the risk of conflict contagion. They counter 
previous studies explaining contagion “as a consequence of the spill-over of conflict externalities 
and/or patterns of emulation between kin groups across borders” and assert that those studies are 
incomplete (Maves and Braithwaite 2013, 2). Rather, Maves and Braithwaite suggest that 
countries most susceptible to cross-national demonstration effects are those that have no political 
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maneuvering room left to satisfy increasing opposition demands. Internal opposition demands in 
this case are potentially inspired by rebels’ employment of violent strategies in neighboring 
states. Their study specifically focuses on 140 cases of autocratic governments, and in particular 
those with an elected legislature.  In their analysis, autocracies are coded as “those regimes in 
which at least one of the following conditions is not met: both the legislature and the executive 
are elected, multiple political parties outside the influence of the regime exist and compete in 
these elections, and executive power has been handed over peacefully between parties as the 
result of elections” (Maves and Braithwaite 2013, 14). They find that while having a legislature 
generally reduces the likelihood of conflict onset in an autocratic state, that effect is reversed in 
the event that a neighboring state is experiencing civil conflict. 
In studying another aspect of civil war contagion, intervention, Jacob D. Kathman 
examines the threats that neighboring third parties experience in close proximity to a civil war. 
“Destruction, regime stability, even state survival are threatened by the prospect of civil war 
infection” (Kathman 2010, 989). He argues that these third parties are motivated to intervene in 
neighboring civil wars out of self-preservation. In examining all civil wars since World War II 
from the Correlates of War State System Data (2005), he generates a measure of every state’s 
yearly likelihood of being infected by a neighboring civil war. He describes intervention as a 
force of influence. It could include either military or economic activities, covertly or overtly, but 
it is “targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance 
of power between the government and opposition forces” (Kathman 2010, 989). This could be 
motivated by ties of allegiance, stopping costly hostilities, or stabilizing the region.  
Although Kathman notes that “a disproportionately large percentage of interventions, 
about one-third, are undertaken by contiguous states” (Kathman 2010, 992), the majority of 
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neighbor states choose not to intervene (1007). In his major hypothesis, Kathman speculates that 
“as a potential intervener’s likelihood of being infected by a contiguous civil war increases, the 
potential intervener’s likelihood of intervening in the conflict also increases” (Kathman 2010, 
993). This suggests that the longer a neighboring conflict continues, the higher the potential for 
the country in question to intervene for the sake of its own interest will continue to rise.  
 
Section II: Qualitative Analysis 
Introduction 
In discussing the relationship between the governments that host refugees and the United 
Nations High Council on Refugees (UNHCR), Michael Kagan finds evidence of what has 
become a “UN surrogate state” in many of these situations. In his 2012 paper, he studies how 
this phenomenon has taken shape in the Middle East, where most countries hosting refugees 
observed “a de facto shift of responsibility from sovereign governments to the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR)
1
 to directly administer refugee policy.” Kagan finds this shift to be an 
anomaly, albeit one that offers tremendous advantages to some host governments. Countries such 
as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria have existing UN refugee bureaucracies that have long since eased 
the enormous burden of hosting refugees, both through UNHCR, and for the case of Palestinians, 
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East). 
Jordan serves as a prime example of this phenomenon. Despite this independence of 
administration, these countries are still at risk during times of neighboring conflict. Kagan writes 
                                                 
1
 UNHCR literally stands for “United Nations High Council on Refugees.” However, in their own documentation 
and goods, such as tents and supplies, they clearly identify themselves in public as “The UN Refugee Agency.” In 
public, the agency itself seems to self-identify as both, and in Kagan’s article he uses both. 
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that UNHCR has found that “in general, Arab states are accustomed to hosting large numbers of 
foreigners but are not open to offering permanent integration to them absent exceptional political 
calculations.” Although Jordan did grant immediate citizenship to many Palestinians due to 
Jordan’s initial occupation and annexation of the West Bank during the exceptional political 
situations surrounding the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan now tends to follow this model as well. 
Most Arab governments have a tendency to allow migrants as temporary guests rather 
than explicit asylum-seekers, which takes the responsibility away from the host government and 
shifts it to agencies such as UNHCR, foreign governments, and non-government organizations. 
UNHCR notes that “shifting responsibility for refugee populations to UN agencies can provide a 
ready explanation for the otherwise contradictory facts of long-term residence and the non-
integration of refugees in Arab states. In the absence of a foreign state of origin or employment 
sponsor that can take responsibility for the migrants, visibly attaching a group of foreigners to 
the UN can serve to explain why they cannot be, and need not be, integrated to the host 
community,” (Kagan, 9). This, among other complex factors, helps to explain why Jordan 
continues to refuse entry to several thousand Syrian-Palestinians, as well as many single males 
and many people without documentation, according to human rights monitoring organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch. It is reported that the majority of them have been refused entry 
into Jordan outright, but there is a separate camp in Jordan that is only housing Syrian-
Palestinians, and contains at least 2,000 refugees there. Human Rights Watch notes that “such a 
policy violates the international law principle of nonrefoulement, which forbids governments 
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from returning refugees and asylum seekers to places where their lives or freedom would be 
threatened.” 2 
Jordan was forever changed by the massive integration of Palestinians following the 
events of 1948 and 1967. One could infer from this language that the Jordanian government 
seemingly wants to avoid having such a large integration to happen again. In light of Jordan’s 
prior experience with the integration of Palestinian refugees from 1948-onward, the government 
of Jordan (GOJ) has sought to limit the duration and scope of future refugee flows. “Jordan 
reached an agreement with UNHCR in 1997 establishing a basis for UNHCR's office in the 
country, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1998, as well as a temporary agreement in 
2003 that was specific to Iraqi refugees,” (Kagan 10). Jordan also made new arrangements with 
UNHCR to delineate its responsibilities with regards to the current influx of Syrian refugees.  A 
key feature of these MOUs between Jordan and UNHCR indicate clearly that Jordan is a “transit 
country only,” describing the presence of refugees as a “sojourn.”  
General Effects 
Jacobsen (2002a) talks about one of the positive results of having to take care of a 
refugee population is that it would extend the state’s bureaucratic reach to outlying areas, to the 
periphery, which relates to the previously discussed issue of state capacity. Prior to the Syrian 
uprising, the Mafraq governorate, which hosts Jordan’s massive and growing Za’atari refugee 
camp
3
, was relatively quiet. Since the uprising, Mafraq city has turned into a bustling city with a 
large presence of foreign aid workers and journalists visiting and working there, not to mention 
the growing refugee population. This kind of growth and expansion is consistent with Jacobsen’s 
                                                 
2
 Human Rights Watch. “Jordan: Obama Should Press King on Asylum Seeker Pushbacks.” Human Rights Watch 
website. 21 March, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/21/jordan-obama-should-press-king-asylum-seeker-
pushbacks. 
3
 Luck, Taylor. “Syrian influx to Jordan rises as second camp grows,” Jordan Times, 15 April, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/syrian-influx-to-jordan-rises-as-second-camp-grows. 
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assertions. The infrastructure, economy, bureaucratic structures, and security have all had to be 
significantly improved in order to maintain such fast growth, thus strengthening an outlying area 
of the country that was previously neglected. Jordan has a very long border with Syria (375 km, 
or 233 miles) that is normally unmonitored outside of official crossing points, and until a 
massive demining effort  was heavily saturated with land mines. The dangers of the proximate 
civil war and humanitarian concerns of protecting refugees force Jordan to patrol the border 
areas much more heavily than in the past. 
In addition to patrols, the Jordanian military is taking steps to add more monitoring 
equipment to the lengthy border. According to Gen. Mishaal Zaben, Jordan’s Army chief of 
staff, Jordan will be installing more “cameras, radar and sophisticated early detection equipment 
to help prevent smuggling and infiltrations across the border and assist Syrian refugees as they 
cross into Jordan.” The equipment will “significantly bolster Jordan’s defenses along the border 
with Syria,” he said.4 This is a significant upgrade to an outlying area of the country that had 
previously been neglected. The intense fighting near the Syrian side of the border has created a 
high-tension situation in Jordan, requiring increased patrols to protect both Jordanian towns and 
the refugees attempting to cross the border.
5
 
Jacobsen’s (2002b) conclusions about refugee livelihoods are difficult to prove or apply 
in Jordan, as refugees’ options for income generating activities and their livelihoods in general 
are severely limited in Jordan’s urban host communities. Consumer prices for most goods have 
increased since the Syrian crisis began, but rents have increased significantly. In many areas that 
have larger populations of Syrian refugees, average rents have more than doubled. Estimates 
                                                 
4
 Associated Press, “Jordan aid to rebels raises tensions with Syria,” Ammon News, 5 April, 2013. 
http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=20591. 
5
 Luck, Taylor. “Syrian jihadists’ gains near border place Jordan on ‘high alert,’” Jordan Times, 24 March, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/syrian-jihadists-gains-near-border-place-jordan-on-high-alert. 
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show that as many as 80% of Syrians in Jordan are living outside of the refugee camps, either 
renting apartments or staying with relatives. The biggest problems that urban refugees both face 
and cause are exacerbated because many of them do not register with UNHCR, which would 
enable them to secure additional UN assistance and access local services. However, according to 
a report by the International Rescue Committee, “many refugees remain reluctant to register 
because they fear retribution should the Syrian government become aware they fled.” 6  
Rapid increases in demand and prices for rent and goods and services in and near the 
refugee hosting areas have elevated the situation in Jordan into what the UN would consider to 
be a “protracted refugee situation.” To make matters worse, the “refugee resources” that Syrians 
brought with them to Jordan have long since been depleted. Many refugees now face an 
additional burden in paying rent once the limited-term housing assistance from charitable 
organizations dries up. According to an official with the International Catholic Migration 
Commission, “A lot of the Syrian refugees living in urban areas have been evicted because they 
couldn’t pay rent anymore, so some have gone back to the refugee camp and others have gone 
back to Syria. They had no choice.” Some urban refugees have been able to receive one-time 
cash payments for things like clothes and rent, but those funds dry up quickly, and work is 
scarce. There are no Income-Generating Programs for Syrian refugees, and in the current 
economic climate, the Jordanian government fears that publicizing these kinds of programs 
within Jordan could create a negative response from a Jordanian public tired of high 
unemployment rates.
7
  
 
                                                 
6
 International Rescue Committee. “Syria: A Regional Crisis – The IRC Commission on Syrian Refugees.” 
International Rescue Committee, 2013. http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
file/IRCReportMidEast20130114.pdf. 
7
 UNHCR. News Stories. “Syrians in Jordan: A community of refugees flowers in the desert.” UNHCR website. 
Accessed 20 April, 2013.  http://www.unhcr.org/51407d7f9.html. 
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Health 
As discussed in the previous section, Jacobsen (2002a) describes health concerns as being 
one of main reasons governments don’t want to have open border policy toward refugees. Syria 
has become a textbook example of a war zone, and it has all of the conditions and problems that 
one would expect with regard to health. The Jordanian government and its citizens are rightfully 
wary of letting these problems come in with the victims. The literature (Jacobsen 2002a, Baez 
2008) warns of the potential health problems surrounding refugees and the problems that can 
develop within and around refugee camps. Disease outbreaks, epidemics, and malnutrition are 
warned of by all of the literature when they discuss potential health problems in relation to 
hosting refugee populations. Bloody dysentery, malaria, pneumonia, meningitis, measles, 
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, and skin diseases are just a short list of what 
could be seen and spread easily. Health services are already reporting outbreaks of measles and 
other problems starting to surface within the refugee population.
8
 One of the biggest problems 
sure to impact developing countries receiving refugees is the overburdening of healthcare 
facilities and supplies. The costs of this healthcare is becoming too much for Jordan’s 
government to bear. Jordan’s Ministry of Health says that it “spends half of its budget on 
medical care for Syrians alone and needs about $350 million in emergency funding to sustain the 
country’s public-health-care system past April, 2013.”9 Large numbers of refugees come into 
Jordan critically wounded and requiring intensive medical care to recover. 
In general, refugees fleeing from a war zone are bound to arrive with severe injuries and 
health problems, and they have to be treated. As the numbers of refugees passes 500,000 and on 
                                                 
8
 Malkawi, Khetam. “13 cases of measles detected among Syrian refugees,” Jordan Times, 17 April, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/13-cases-of-measles-detected-among-syrian-refugees. 
9
 Luck, Taylor. “In Jordan, tensions rise between Syrian refugees and host community.” Washington Post, 22 April, 
2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-jordan-tensions-rise-between-syrian-refugees-and-
host-community/2013/04/21/d4f5fa24-a762-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html?hpid=z3. 
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its way to 1.2 million by the end of the year, Jordan’s healthcare facilities are reportedly in crisis-
mode.
10
 In their January, 2013 report, IRC determined that gaining access to medical care in 
Jordan is now a bigger problem for Jordanians and refugees alike.
11
 Many of these refugees have 
serious and life-threatening war wounds, chronic illnesses and other medical needs, and have 
already flooded the few hospitals and clinics where they can receive free services.
12
 The costs are 
significant and health workers reported to IRC that the sheer volume of refugees is filling 
hospital beds “faster than they can find them.” Aid agencies are also beginning to respond to 
calls for psychological and social support within the refugee communities. The refugees escape 
the violence and destruction of Syria, where there are reports of atrocities being committed and 
sexual violence being employed against the population, and they then find themselves in a 
crowded, sometimes desperate situation where domestic abuse is flourishing in the wake of their 
escape. In the wake of reports indicating that sexual violence is being employed in the Syrian 
civil war, Syrian women in particular are in need of counseling services and are starting to 
receive them.
13
 
Education 
In line with the findings of the previously discussed literature (Jacobsen 2002b, Whitaker 
2002, Baez 2008), Jordan’s education system has been overburdened by the influx of Syrian 
refugees into the host communities. As stated before, 80% of Syrian refugees in Jordan are living 
in urban environments rather than in the camps, and the majority of refugees are women and 
                                                 
10
 Luck, Taylor. “Syrians pour into Jordan as ‘healthcare crisis looms,” Jordan Times, 9 April, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/syrians-pour-into-jordan-as-healthcare-crisis-looms. 
11
 International Rescue Committee. “Syria: A Regional Crisis – The IRC Commission on Syrian Refugees.” 
International Rescue Committee, 2013. http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
file/IRCReportMidEast20130114.pdf. 
12
 Rowling, Megan. “Syrian refugees struggle to access healthcare in Jordan,” AlertNet, 17 January, 2013. 
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/syrian-refugees-struggle-to-access-healthcare-in-jordan/. 
13
 Abuqudairi, Areej. “Syrian refugee women in need of psycho-social support,” Jordan Times, 14 April, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/syrian-refugee-women-in-need-of-psycho-social-support. 
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children. Although in some areas there have been reports of wait-lists to get into local schools, 
Jordan’s education ministry says that “Syrians already residing in host communities across the 
country [are] free to register their children in standard public schools.”14 To accommodate this 
additional pressure on Jordan’s education system, the government has changed some schools in 
areas with high concentrations of Syrian refugees to work in double-shifts, teaching girls in the 
morning and boys in the afternoon.
15
  
Estimates place the number of Syrian students registered at schools in Jordan in the tens 
of thousands, but there is no available data on how many of them are actually attending. Many 
Syrian parents are wary of setting down roots for their children, hoping that they can return to 
Syria soon. UNESCO is working together with the Jordan Ministry of Education and its local 
partners promote educational opportunities for Syrian refugees and the young Jordanians 
affected by the Syrian refugee crisis.
16
 UNESCO Jordan director, Anna Paolini, says that 
“Conflict and displacement can have a devastating impact on the educational prospects of 
displaced persons as well as burden the education systems of neighboring host communities,” 
and that “UNESCO plays an active role in promoting education as a key tool in preventing 
conflict and rebuilding lives in emergency and post-conflict situations.” In addition to promoting 
opportunities, they are working to build teachers’ capacities and “offer demand-driven informal 
and non-formal education programmes and vocational skills development opportunities for 
Syrian youth inside the refugee camps and for Jordanian and Syrian youth in urban areas.” 
                                                 
14
 Luck, Taylor. “Jordan to Open School for Syrian Refugees,” Jordan Times, 5 August, 2012. 
http://jordantimes.com/jordan-to-open-school-for-syrian-refugees. 
15
 Gittleson, Ben. “Syrian Refugees, Children Struggle in Jordan.” Al-Monitor, 2 December, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/syrianrefugeesjordan.html. 
16
 UNESCO, “UNESCO/EU €4.3 million project for young Syrian refugees in Jordan.” UNESCO website. 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/amman/about-this-office/single-
view/news/supporting_the_futures_of_young_syrian_refugees_in_jordan/.  Accessed 20 April, 2013. 
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Without programs such as these, Jordan’s education system would be considerably less effective 
for both the local and refugee populations. 
Environment 
Virtually all of the literature on the general effects of hosting refugees cites the use and 
overuse of scarce resources as a source of conflict between the host and refugee communities. 
For example, Whitaker (2002) predicts that existing resource problems will be compounded by 
the presence of refugees. Since Jordan is the 4
th
 most water-scarce country on earth
17
, it may be 
the archetypal case for this problem. Jordan’s water resources have been used more than they 
have been replenished almost every year since the 1980’s. Jordan’s public water utilities are only 
able to provide roughly a third (150 cubic meters) of the suggested international water standards 
(500 cubic meters) per person per year. Adding half a million people to Jordan’s existing 6.7 
million citizens,  in addition to Jordan’s large groups of other immigrants, is putting an 
expectedly big strain on Jordan’s environment and water supplies. The Mafraq governorate, 
which hosts the Za’atari refugee camp, has more than doubled in size since the Syrian refugee 
crisis began, and is experiencing bigger and more frequent resource problems because of it, 
including delays, disruptions, and limited amounts of water service to virtually all sectors.
18
 
The water infrastructure in the northern parts of Jordan is deteriorating faster than 
expected. Additionally, there have been shortages of equipment and staff to deal with these 
issues, and many wells are inoperable or too saline. The Mafraq Water Directorate notes that the 
main aquifer is suffering from over-extraction. They are also concerned about higher pressures 
on the sewage network and worry that wastewater could pollute the aquifer. Nearly one million 
                                                 
17
 Oxfam, “Syrian refugee influx adding to Jordan’s water worries.” Oxfam Conflict & Emergencies blog, 22 
March, 2013. http://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blogs/13-03-22-syria-refugees-adding-jordan-water-worries. 
18
 Namrouqa, Hana. “Parched summer lies ahead for Mafraq residents.” Jordan Times, 19 March, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/parched-summer-lies-ahead-for-mafraq-residents. 
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gallons, roughly three to four thousand cubic meters, is delivered to Za’atari every day. As a 
result, water delivery to households in the host community has seen shortages and longer 
delivery wait times, and farmers have experienced crop losses. Oxfam has observed
19
 that local 
Jordanians are blaming the refugee influx for these problems, and recent protests
20
 outside the 
sprawling, nine square mile refugee camp have shown that some Jordanians are ready for the 
Syrians to go back to Syria. Adrian Martin (2005) would classify this type of protest activity as 
an “unproductive intergroup conflict.” Martin describes examples of productive conflicts as 
including participatory discussions that involve representatives from all parties involved. These 
kinds of participatory management programs do not appear to have happened in Jordan despite 
the country’s pre-existing severe water scarcity problems. The shortages and limitations in 
service currently being experienced could ignite new inter-group conflicts between the refugee 
and host populations. 
Even public schools in the area have suffered water shortages in the last year and have 
had to resort to buying water from water tanker delivery trucks every week. One principal, Suad 
Shdeifat, notes that “it is our moral responsibility to host our Syrian brothers and sisters, but the 
crisis in Syria is taking its toll on our daily life and our most basic human right, which is 
water.”21 Organizations such as MercyCorps are working to build wells into a non-renewable 
aquifer that lies deep below Za’atari, and expect that it will provide water for at least 65,000 
refugees in the camp, but it is unknown how long these supplies will last. In addition to their 
efforts inside the camp, MercyCorps is also working in coordination with the US Agency for 
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International Development on a US $20 million grant to help rehabilitate host community water 
networks in areas most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis.
22
 
Economy, Trade, Labor, and Prices 
Jacobsen describes how one of the main refugee resources, humanitarian aid, “trickles” 
into host communities. This aid can consist of money, food aid and non-food aid, which could 
include material and personnel “intended to provide for the medical, shelter, security, 
educational, and repatriation/resettlement needs of refugees” (Jacobsen 2002a, 581). She notes 
that measuring the economic impact of hosting refugees is notoriously difficult, but finds that 
“since host communities are not economically homogenous, the effects of these changes will 
vary for different groups. Inevitably, some groups will be marginalized, and others will gain 
disproportionately” (Jacobsen 2002a, 586). The costs of caring for the rapidly expanding 
population have been very high. Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh commented that 
“about $600 million was spent by the government on taking care of refugees as of last year, with 
only one-third coming from international donors,” with the cost of running just the Za’atari 
refugee camp up to $2.5 million per day.
23
 The World Food Programme (WFP) manages 
extensive food voucher systems for refugees who are registered with UNHCR. Those registered 
receive 24 Jordanian Dinars (JOD) per person per month, which equals about $34USD per 
person.
24
 Oxfam estimates that the vouchers account for between 10% and 75% of refugee food 
purchases, depending on what part of Jordan in which they are living. Oxfam also notes an 
extreme disparity in the ratio of urban refugees’ income and expenditures. CARE Jordan 
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estimates that the average income shortfall is 185 JOD per month, about $261USD.
25
 They found 
that many spend more than twice what they bring in from vouchers, in-kind assistance, and odd-
jobs. This has resulted in an emerging debt crisis for many Syrian refugees, with many of them 
owing several hundred Dinars to friends, family, or local businesses, with little means to repay 
them.  
In regard to the economy, trade, and labor, the findings reflected in the literature review 
accurately predict how the situation in Jordan is playing out. People who were already well-off 
before the Syrian crisis – those with capital and companies to run – are better off now than they 
were before.  Conversely, the people who were already struggling before the Syrian crisis find 
themselves with an even more difficult situation. The unemployment rate remains high (12.8%) 
in the country despite increases in GDP and demand. Because refugees are willing to work for 
far less than locals, current estimates place the number of Syrians working in Jordan at more than 
160,000, bringing the estimates for the total number of foreign laborers in Jordan to as high as 
700,000.
26
 Recent estimates by the Mafraq Labor Department show that 90% of Syrians working 
in Mafraq governorate are doing so illegally.
27
 Jordan’s past refugee flows provide a unique 
opportunity for comparison and allow for a deeper understanding of their effects on the country. 
Jawad Anani, an economist and president of Jordan’s Economic and Social Council notes that 
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“while Iraqis came [after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq] to Jordan with investments and were 
effectively job creators, Syrians are arriving as job-takers.”28 
With few exceptions, the majority of Syrian refugees both inside and outside the camp 
are not permitted to seek legal employment, however there are reports that more than 160,000 
Syrians are working inside Jordan without proper documentation. This poses “a challenge to 
strategic plans to combat unemployment among young Jordanians” (Hazaimeh, 2013). Syrian 
refugees are not able to work legally in all professions. Additionally, they are restricted from 
working in any border areas, including in farm areas in the Jordan Valley.
29
 Many take loans 
from shop keepers and landlords and are in serious debt. Others find under-the-table jobs as day 
laborers and farmers, but work long hours and get paid well under market rate.”   Oxfam notes 
that the vast majority of Syrian refugees who do find employment are men. IRC also reports that 
commodity prices are up and wages are down. These impacts are exacerbating an already tense 
relationship between the host and refugee communities.  
Some Jordanian business owners readily admit that they prefer to hire Syrians, 
particularly in areas of the economy that many Jordanians do not want to work in. “Syrians are 
devoted and hard working,” one car wash owner said.30 “I do not have any problem hiring 
anyone as long as they respect their job and do their job efficiently.” In these types of jobs in 
Jordan, owners complain that Jordanians often have the “habit of quitting without notice.” The 
wage paid to casual laborers has reportedly dropped by 50% in some places. “According to the 
Labour Ministry, Syrians who are caught working illegally in Jordan are given two warnings 
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before they are subject to fines but not deportation. The ministry attributed this “leniency” to the 
fact that Syrians cannot be deported back to Syria due to the ongoing violence.” While prices in 
most areas have not expanded in the ways witnessed by Baez in Tanzania, there have been 
noticeable price increases in Jordan. The World Food Program cites recent estimates by the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization that the average “food basket” costs have gone up about 8 
percent in the last year, to about 130 Jordanian Dinars, or $183 per month.
31
 
Crime and Violence 
Tales of a dismal existence are usually all one hears and reads about coming from the 
Za’atari refugee camp, just outside of Mafraq, Jordan. Za’atari was the first camp built 
specifically for the Syrian refugee influx, and has now grown to more than twice its intended 
size. A second camp has been built in Zarqa to accommodate tens of thousands more, and has 
recently begun to take in new refugees. The camp was built on top of a barren desert, and 
because of short-sighted actions like bulldozing the land to make it even instead of rocky, “the 
slightest wind [creates a sandstorm],” sometimes causing more than 150 children per day to go to 
the hospital with respiratory problems.
32
 During heavy rainstorms in the winter, the dusty ground 
turned to mud, and floods destroyed many tents. Aside from many women and children, the 
camp is also home to thousands of single young men, some of whom are perceived to exploit any 
opportunity to “agitate and throw stones and even jeopardize the aid they are receiving.”33 As the 
numbers in Za’atari have swelled, safety and security have degenerated, with theft, fires and riots 
commonplace. Residents say there is palpable tension in the air; aid workers have been attacked, 
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even hospitalized, and journalists beaten.
34
 The cumulative effects of more than two years of 
these kinds of events happening has made the Jordanian population wary about allowing 
additional Syrians to enter Jordan. 
There have been continual reports of theft of UNHCR, UNICEF, and other agencies’ 
materials, with the sum of the thefts totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. Items small and 
large have made their way out of the camp via smugglers and into the surrounding 
communities.
35
 There are frequent protests in Jordan’s Za’atari camp. The protests are often 
about living conditions, but are also in response to Jordan’s perceived inaction in helping the 
Syrian opposition, as well as protests by Syrians in Amman regarding the West’s failure to aid 
the opposition. Protests seeking to have the Syrians returned to Syria are also starting to appear 
in the conflict’s third year, with some of the more recent protests becoming increasingly 
violent.
36
 There have also been protests outside the entrance to Za’atari by Jordanians. Jacobsen 
warns that “an initial welcoming response to refugees can evolve into resentment and threats 
against them if the community perceives the refugees to be causing more problems than benefits” 
(Jacobsen2002a, 591). This seems to be the current state of affairs. 
Crime within Za’atari has been steadily increasing and changing in nature. UNHCR has 
been actively increasing the security presence in and around the camp to mitigate such problems 
as drug trafficking and prostitution, among other problems emerging recently. Because of the 
size of the refugee population in the camp, more than 140,000 people in a space initially 
designed for less than half that total, aid agencies have begun to refer to it as Jordan’s de facto 
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fourth-largest city.
37
 Because refugees flow into areas far from urban centers, such as the Za’atari 
camp for Syrian refugees, policing such a far-flung area can be a difficult task. The threat of 
rebel groups attempting to operate in the same area creates a big challenge for the state security 
apparatus. Jordan has made significant efforts to keep Syrian army and police defectors separate 
from the general Za’atari camp population. It has been reported that the camp does not include 
anyone from those groups. There are reportedly “about 2,000 former soldiers, including senior 
officers, [who] were settled at the Rachi camp…. Soldiers who have defected can leave their 
families at Za’atari and visit from time to time with special permission from the Jordanian 
authorities.”38  
There has been virtually no public discussion about the whereabouts or activities of 
defectors that have remained in Jordan.
39
 Defectors are not allowed to return officially again to 
Jordan if they go back to Syria.
40
 This policy is a direct effort to prevent the Syrian opposition 
from organizing and operating from Jordanian territory. Such organizing has become a threat to 
Jordan in the past, but another concern that the Jordanian government wants to avoid is the 
potential threat of Syrian “sleeper cells” infiltrating the country with the intent to cause harm to 
Jordan or assassinate defectors. Jordan has already seen arms and ammunition find its way from 
Syrian battlefields and into the hands of Jordanian extremists desiring to cause disruption in the 
capital and harm to Westerners and upset the stability and sovereignty of the Jordanian 
government. 
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There are also concerns about the movement of fighters in the opposite direction. The 
Jordanian Salafist movement has been vocally supportive of the rebellion against the Syrian 
regime and actively encourages young Jordanians to fight alongside the rebel groups in Syria. In 
light of Jordan’s history of transnational rebels and current international law, the trafficking of 
weapons across the Jordanian border is illegal, and it is the government of Jordan’s responsibility 
to enforce it. One of the more prominent crime problems associated with the civil war has been 
the frequent movement of Jordanian Salafist fighters back and forth across the border.
41
 The 
Salafist movement claims that there are more than 500 Jordanians fighting in Syria
42
, and 
estimate that at least 35 have died.
43
 Jordan is actively enforcing its laws regarding the border, 
and continues to arrest Jordanians that they apprehend attempting to enter illegally into Syria. 
Because the Za’atari refugee camp is subject to a closed security system, there are only 
very restricted movements between the camp and the surrounding communities. Syrians need to 
be “sponsored” by a Jordanian to be allowed to leave, and Jordanians need special permits to 
enter the camp for any reason. This locked-down situation does alleviate many issues that Jordan 
would historically worry about, such as the militarization of the refugee population and the 
scourge of illicit activities between Jordanians and the refugee population. Even with security 
having been reinforced in recent months, there are still attacks on aid workers, riots planned by 
the younger members of the refugee population at night, and dangerous conditions for women, 
particularly in poorly lit areas at night. Beginning in March 2013, the Jordanian police have 
taken over camp management, under the umbrella of a new entity known as the “Syrian Refugee 
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Camp Directorate.” They are attempting to make significant new strides in security enforcement. 
The Jordanian government is making requests to the UN Security Council for action to highlight 
the “burdens and difficult humanitarian conditions” facing the country because of the refugee 
influx.
44
 
Transnational Effects 
Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012) warn that proximity to a state like Somalia invited serious 
problems for Kenya. Today, Somalia is regarded by many as a “failed state,” which could be 
defined as a state’s inability “to provide basic services” such as “protection from external threats, 
rule of law, and basic social services. Cojanu and Popescu (2007) insist that “there is no 
agreement on the definition of state failure,” but refer to Zartman (1995), who define’s failure as 
occurring when “the basic functions of the state are no longer performed” (Cojanu and Popescu 
2007, 115). They warn that these situations are linked to problems like “humanitarian 
catastrophes; mass migration; environmental degradation; regional instability; energy insecurity; 
global pandemics; international crime; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and, of 
course, transnational terrorism” (Cojanu and Popescu 2007, 114). There are now observations 
that Syria may be on the road to becoming a failed state.
45
 Despite continuous,
46
 adamant claims 
by the GOJ that Jordan is only taking a neutral, humanitarian position on the Syrian civil war,
47
 
there has been a stream of reports documenting close security cooperation between the GOJ, 
Western governments, and the Syrian opposition. Additionally, the GOJ has been implicated in 
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facilitating the transfer of weapons and military supplies across its border with Syria.
48
 As a 
result of these activities, the Syrian regime has begun to more openly accuse the Jordanian 
government of interfering in its internal affairs, and has gone so far as to warn that Jordan could 
be engulfed in the fire of their conflict.
49
  
In his 2011 book, Rebels Without Borders, Idean Salehyan notes that it is easier and more 
likely that transnational rebels (TNRs) will access territory in a neighboring country if that 
country’s government is weak. That government may not wish them to do so, but in many cases 
they lack the capacity to prevent it, and can become ensnarled in international disputes. This can 
be observed in Jordan’s past dealings with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  
Jordan’s army was severely weakened in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day war as a result of 
suffering a crushing defeat by Israel. The PLO took advantage of this situation in a climate of 
Palestinian radicalization, and public opinion that Jordan was not doing enough to combat Israeli 
occupation. Although Jordan initially was complicit in allowing PLO cross-border operations 
into Israel, the reprisals and hot-pursuits into Jordanian territory led to a desire in Jordan for 
these operations to cease.  
Rather than stop, the PLO doubled-down its efforts and attempted to create a shadow 
government within Jordan, leading to a brief civil war in the Hashemite Kingdom, which 
climaxed in the “Black September” of 1970. More than 3,000 people died in this conflict, which 
became a short civil war. Most of the casualties were members of the PLO, who relocated their 
headquarters thereafter to Lebanon. Jordan’s current handling of the Syrian refugees, defectors, 
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and the border, reflects the hard-earned wisdom of this experience.
50
 Despite the strain placed by 
the refugee presence on Jordan’s scarce resources, Jordan is a stronger country than it was during 
that time, with better technology and better information systems. The Palestinians that came into 
Jordan following al-Nakba, the Palestinian exodus of 1948, were given full Jordanian citizenship 
without question. While there were refugee camps, they had freedom of movement, which 
enabled the PLO to operate in and around the camps and blend in with the population, utilizing 
its resources. The limitations placed on the Syrians coming into Jordan show that from the 
beginning of the Syrian conflict, the Jordanian government has actively sought to limit the 
potential for these kinds of events to happen again.  
Although many countries have now called for Bashar Al-Assad to step down since the 
start of the Syrian government’s crackdown on dissent after the beginning of the uprising, 
Jordan’s King Abdullah II was the first Arab leader to call for him to relinquish power.51 This 
action was important because it gave the rest of the Arab world an opening to begin publicly 
speaking out against the Assad regime. Despite ongoing insistence from the GOJ regarding its 
neutrality and desire for a political solution to the crisis,
52
 there have been multiple reports over 
the last year that Jordanian military and intelligence services have been involved in directly 
aiding other Arab governments with the transport and transfer of weapons and aid to the Syrian 
                                                 
50
 OnWar. “Black September in Jordan 1970-1971,” OnWar Armed Conflicts Events Data, 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm.  
51
 Bakri, Nada. “King of Jordan Becomes First Arab Leader to Tell Syria’s Assad to Quit.” New York Times, 14 
November, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/world/middleeast/king-of-jordan-calls-on-syrias-assad-to-
quit.html?_r=0. 
52
 Hazaimeh, Hani. “Gov't Reiterates ‘Neutral Position’ Over Syrian Crisis.” Jordan Times, 4 March, 2013. 
http://jordantimes.com/govt-reiterates-neutral-position-over-syrian-crisis. 
David Becker  
46 
 
opposition.
53
 While some of this can be dismissed by the regime as speculation, the high-level 
sources in the reporting would suggest that there is some truth to these events now.  
Evidence collected by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has 
indicated that the GOJ purchased more than 230 tons of Croatian weapons and ammunition for 
$6.5 million, and now those same weapons are appearing on Syrian battlefields.
54
 These efforts 
are believed to be coordinated, and at least partially funded, by the Saudi government, but the 
Jordanian armed forces have been actively aiding the movement and delivery of these weapons 
to the Syrian border.
55
 Rather than allow the Syrian opposition to operate freely in Jordanian 
territory, the GOJ is also reportedly allowing Western intelligence agencies to train specific 
groups of Syrian rebel fighters on Jordanian soil.
56
 Salehyan would probably say that the 
Jordanian government has gone just about as far as it can in terms of supporting the Syrian 
opposition without physically joining in the fight against Assad. In light of recent advances and 
improvements in the tactics and supplies of the rebel groups, and a desire by outside observers to 
see the conflict come to an end sooner, these trainings of former members of the Syrian army and 
police are reportedly increasing and accelerating.
57
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A small contingent of about 150 members of the United States military has been working 
in Jordan for months
58
 to prepare for the consequences of the possible expanded use of Syrian 
chemical weapons.  This contingent is about to be replaced by a new US Army headquarters unit 
of more than 200 specialists, scheduled to build a new headquarters inside a Jordanian military 
installation, and to prepare for the worst case scenarios for the aftermath of Syria’s civil war.59 
There are reports that this new contingent will be working to prepare for a possible force of 
20,000 or more in the event that the US decides to intervene in Syria in coordination with the 
Jordanian military.
60
 Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID), the US, and some Arab 
Gulf allies are reportedly collaborating on intelligence matters in relation to the Syrian crisis. 
The Syrian government has previously made vague statements about its neighbors 
interfering in the conflict, but recent months have seen more specific threats and warnings 
coming from Damascus. In an April, 2013 interview with a local Syrian news channel, Syrian 
President Bashar Al-Assad made his warnings much more explicit than previous statements 
about his geographic neighbors. In the interview, he suggests that “The fire will not stop at our 
borders; all the world knows Jordan is just as exposed [to the crisis] as Syria.”61 This statement 
represents a new level of accusation directly at Jordan and its complicity with several forms and 
sources of foreign intervention in Syria. As the previous literature shows, intervention of any 
kind, let alone hosting militants or assisting them in any way, can become the cause of a new 
conflict. Bashar Al-Assad is referring openly to Jordan’s seeming inability or unwillingness to 
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prevent Salafist fighters from entering Syria, and he alludes to “a bid to invade Syria with forces 
coming from the outside, of different nationalities.” This elevated level of rhetoric highlights the 
new increased risks that Jordan is taking on by intervening in Syrian affairs. These risks have 
begun to manifest more frequently for Jordan’s towns and villages along the Syrian border, such 
as Ramtha, as the conflict has grown more deadly in places like Daraa.
62
 Whether or not that 
intervention is in Jordan, and the region’s, best interest, it is still an intervention in another 
country’s sovereign affairs and risks a potentially violent and dangerous response from the now-
isolated Alawite regime. 
Al-Assad also is beginning to publicly call out the impunity with which he believes 
Syrian rebels are crossing into Syria from Jordan, noting that he “cannot believe that hundreds of 
[rebels] are entering Syria with their weapons while Jordan is capable of arresting any single 
person with a light arm for going to resist in Palestine.” He alludes to Jordan’s complicated and 
bloody history with the violent resistance movements against Israel, and Jordan’s strict 
enforcement of safety on its border with Israel, in comparison to what he perceives as a complete 
freedom of movement for Syrian rebels. This reflects a belief within the Syrian regime of 
Jordan’s complicity with the Syrian rebellion, despite official reports from Jordan that it is not 
supporting or hosting the training of rebels, and instead prefers to push for a political solution. 
The whole region has been feeling the effects of Syria’s civil war. Tensions have also risen along 
Israel’s once-quiet border with Syria along the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. The government 
of Israel reportedly asked the government of Jordan for permission to use their airspace to 
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conduct an air attack on Syria’s chemical weapon sites in 2012, which was denied.63 Recent 
reports, however, allege that under pressure from US President Barack Obama, Jordan has made 
corridors of its airspace open to Israeli drones to spy on, and potentially attack, Syrian 
positions.
64
 Jordan has vehemently denied this coordination with Israel, both to assuage 
Jordanian opposition to anything involving Israel and to continue attempting to convince the 
Syrian government of their neutrality. All of the above listed actions are based on information 
from sources who claim to have accurate information. Whether or not they are true, if the Syrian 
government believes that they are happening, Jordan is still at risk from Syrian reprisals. 
 
Section III: Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study of the impact of hosting refugees is multifaceted. A refugee flow can have 
significant potential, and the policies of the host government determine exactly what happens to 
that potential upon arrival. That potential could be manifested in both positive and negative 
ways, depending on how the host country treats the refugee population and how they are viewed 
by the host population. Jordan is understandably apprehensive about the possibility of a new 
refugee population integrating into the Jordanian melting pot, but for the sake of the livelihoods 
of both the refugees and Jordanians, it is the opinion of this researcher that the GOJ must 
significantly change their approach to how they treat the refugee population. Because they could 
be in Jordan’s communities for a long time, there are many things that Jordan, UNHCR, and the 
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mesh of NGOs operating within Jordan must address in order to mitigate the current problems 
plaguing Syrian refugees and their host communities and to avoid worse problems in the future.  
Because the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are living in urban environments, 
they are unable to take full advantage of services from UNHCR and NGOs working in Jordan. 
These entities need to do much more to access these vulnerable populations and help to keep 
them afloat in this protracted situation. These refugees’ livelihoods are further threatened 
because the vast majority of them are unable to seek gainful employment legally. There is a 
complete absence of Income-Generating Projects available to the refugee population. There are 
several reasons for this, ranging from political opposition from Jordanians to a desire to keep the 
refugees isolated from potential militarization. Despite these reasons, there must be 
considerations to keep this extremely vulnerable population alive and well. Without 
opportunities for income-generation, their immediate futures are in serious jeopardy. Oxfam 
reports that the Jordanian authorities are not in favor of supporting IGPs for Syrian refugees 
living in host communities because they are “concerned that this may take away income and 
opportunities from Jordanians” (Oxfam 2013b, 7). This opposition represents a huge obstacle to 
Syrian livelihoods, but also a delicate political problem for the Jordanian government. At this 
point, they have decided to put Jordanian interests ahead of their humanitarian obligations to the 
Syrian people. 
Even if these organizations and institutions attempt to ensure the well-being of the urban 
refugee population, there are significant funding gaps that put this work at risk. In 2012, the UN 
High Council for Refugees made an international plea for aid for Syrian refugees and internally 
displaced persons of $1.5 billion dollars. By April, 2013, they have only received half of that 
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amount, and the shortfalls are having real effects on the ground.
65
 UNHCR is now “struggling to 
afford simple things like lighting and blankets in some of the refugee camps, let alone sufficient 
security measures in the increasingly insecure Za’atari camp in northern Jordan.” If they do not 
receive new funding, UNHCR said it will have to reduce the healthcare coverage it provides to 
current refugees, making it “simply impossible for UN agencies to provide food, clean water, 
schooling, shelter and healthcare for new refugees who keep streaming in.” Refugees are 
expensive, but when they are placed in a protracted situation in an area where they have limited 
movement and no opportunities to generate income, the international community must come 
through to support them through this difficult time. Because of the donation-supported model 
that UNHCR must operate on and the extremely high costs of managing and caring for such a 
vast and growing humanitarian disaster, refugee support operations of this scale are always going 
to be operating from month-to-month. Estimates of the cost of one year of hosting refugees in 
Jordan alone easily exceed US $1 billion.  
In regard to Jordan’s physical security and managing the threat of conflict and 
transnational rebellion, Jordan’s leadership is walking a very fine line. Virtually everything in 
the literature on exacerbating the risks of conflict contagion is reportedly being done by the 
Jordanian government. The public denials of Jordanian officials are required to avoid open 
conflict, but to the close observer, Jordan has been engulfed in a massive proxy war on all sides, 
and its government is making calculated choices about how to emerge from this neighboring 
conflict in the best security situation possible for Jordan. The leadership of Jordan decided long 
ago that the risks of staying out of the conflict exceeded those of intervention. It is clear from 
these actions that aside from the risk of the conflict physically coming over the border, that the 
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Jordanian regime fears the possible demonstration effect that the Syrian civil war may have on 
the local opposition if Jordan stays out of the conflict.
66
 Jordan’s local chapter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, politically active as a party called the Islamic Action Front (IAF), may see an 
opportunity to change the balance of power in Jordan’s autocratic regime. The IAF has long been 
a proponent for reform and acted as a loyal opposition. Recently, it has criticized the regime’s 
current reform efforts as not doing enough. While IAF has not by any means called for the 
removal of the Hashemite regime, the literature discussing the potential demonstration effect for 
opposition groups neighboring a civil conflict predicts that its role as the largest opposition group 
in Jordan could be influenced by the demonstration effect of Syria’s civil war. While a 
militarized IAF is a far-fetched conclusion, there may be a fear in Jordan’s halls of power that 
observing the opposition in a neighboring country take up arms may provide the IAF or others 
with an inspiration. 
In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood, there is also concern that Jordan’s Salafist 
movement could feel empowered by its efforts to assist the opposition in Syria and turn its sights 
on the Jordanian regime. There is a real possibility that the demonstration effect, especially so 
local, could be strong in Jordan. The country’s efforts at securing the border have largely been 
targeted at preventing a mass flow of Jordanian fighters into Syria in order to avoid the 
appearance of outward support of the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. Jordan’s 
leadership is deeply concerned about the possibility of these fighters gaining experience and 
developing an ideology that would encourage them to use their skills against the Jordanian 
government in the future. 
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There are too many unanswered questions about Jordan’s tacit and direct involvement in 
opposing the Syrian regime. However, many of them might be answered in the coming weeks 
and months, as Jordan’s already-close security cooperation with Israel and the United States is 
becoming even closer and more active. The Arab rumor mills are spinning wildly with theories 
of joint expeditionary interventions, buffer areas in southern Syria, Patriot missile batteries in 
Jordan
67
, and no-fly zones. These possibilities represent some of the furthest extremes that 
Jordan and its international partners could take into intervening in this neighboring conflict. 
While the possibilities for long-term security benefits for Jordan and Israel are tempting, there 
are conversely frightening possibilities of retaliation coming from Syria that could have dire 
repercussions inside Jordan. In the event that a large-scale US-led intervention is planned and 
originates from Jordanian territory, it is bound to bring with it local unrest from the Jordanian 
people. The recently-announced group of American soldiers bound for Jordan has already 
produced an outcry from local opposition parties.
68
 Even further, the specter of an invasion of 
Syria from Jordan is sure to conjure an even bigger negative response locally, potentially 
reviving Jordan’s earlier protest movements that occurred during the Arab Spring. Any potential 
invasion of Syria, especially from within a neighboring country, will serve to confirm Assad’s 
public paranoia that there is a Western conspiracy against him and bolster his anti-imperialist 
credentials. 
The events unfolding indicate that Jordan’s concerns for its own security may drive it to 
cooperate with the US and Jordan’s regional partners in potentially intervening in the Syrian 
conflict. In the eyes of the Syrian government, any action taken by Jordan to interfere with its 
                                                 
67
 Middle East Monitor, “Jordanian source: Washington will deploy ‘Patriot’ on the border with Syria.” Middle East 
Monitor, 19 April, 2013. http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/5790-jordanian-source-washington-
will-deploy-qpatriotq-on-the-border-with-syria. 
68
 Ali, Anas. “Protesters reject US military presence in Jordan.” Ammon News, 26 April, 2013. 
http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=20708. 
David Becker  
54 
 
civil war will be considered intervention. After two years of constantly worrying about its 
northern security, Jordan may have decided that intervening in some ways may shorten the 
conflict and minimize the potential risks of allowing a prolonged civil war in Syria. Although the 
US is extremely wary
69
 of becoming enmeshed in another messy Middle East war, United States 
and European intelligence agencies have all but confirmed that there have been uses of chemical 
weapons in Syria.
70
 In light of this discovery, the US is becoming much more likely to start 
supplying the Syrian opposition with military aid and is reportedly reconsidering previously 
discarded options of intervention.
71
  
Because of these developments, it is becoming more evident that events have been set 
into motion that Jordan no longer has true control over. Large percentages of Jordan’s population 
may be truly opposed to allowing US intervention to operate from Jordan, but the fact remains 
that the scope and nature of this conflict is changing and growing each day. The more involved 
Jordan becomes in any potential or current intervention, the more likely it is that Jordan will 
suffer negative consequences as a result of it. Studying events as they evolve is obviously 
difficult – there are far too many variables and too many things happening in the shadows to 
really know what is happening. The only thing that is clear is that the further Jordan involves 
itself with this conflict, the greater the chances that it will itself become infected by it in 
seriously harmful ways. 
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